Distribution Channels and the decision to expand them: An approach from the Industrial Organization
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26423/rcpi.v9i2.428Keywords:
Distribution, dual channel, online channel, game theory, Nash equilibriumAbstract
Conventional distribution channels have been challenged by new technologies that change consumer habits The purpose of this article is to investigate the problem that exists between producers and distributors regarding the decision to open online distribution channels in addition to the existing traditional one. Previous research has approached the decision to open a new distribution channel only from the point of view of marketing operations research, while this study starts from the organizational point of view. Through a systematic literature review, taking into consideration the evolution of modern distribution concepts and practices, a theoretical framework based on game theory, especially collaborative games, was developed. Applying a simulated case, it was observed that Nash equilibrium and backward induction in dynamic games is the best approach to face the decision of opening a new online distribution channel. This research was based on the retail sector, and it is suggested to extend it to other sectors, such as services. The theoretical framework developed will help decision makers to have a broader and better structured approach to opening new online distribution channels.
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